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Abstract
We introduce ethical agents into an analysis of decision making in a profit-maximising
firm. Agents can adopt a profitable new practice that may harm customers. Their
decision reflects moral considerations, organisational culture, and compensation con-
tracts. We analyse both utilitarian and deontological (duty-based) philosophical
traditions. Cultural assimilation emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon. With
sophisticated customers, the principal enables a culture that achieves the highest
possible aggregate surplus and, under deontological ethics, both the principal and
the customers would prefer to deal with less ethically committed agents. In contrast,
the principal designs compensation to enable cultures that exploit na¨ıve customers.
Keywords: Culture, ethics, behavioural norms, bonuses.
JEL Classification: D03, G02, G20.
1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008–09 cast a harsh light upon a number of practices in the financial
services sector. For example, numerous commentators have pointed to questionable practices
in the subprime mortgage lending market, where risky mortgage loans were sold to poor and
financially unsophisticated people who did not understand the scale of the risks to which
they were exposing themselves (see, e.g., Bar-Gill (2009) and Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David,
Chomsisengphete, and Evanoff (2014)). Financial institutions in the United Kingdom have
been pilloried for using high-pressure tactics to sell Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) to
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retail consumers who did not understand the product, and who often had no need for it.1 In
general, Ce´le´rie and Valle´e (2013) find that structured products exhibit more financial com-
plexity and have a higher “hidden markup” when distributed to less sophisticated investors.
But malpractice is not restricted to the retail financial sector. Fixings of the standard money
market LIBOR benchmark were systematically manipulated for years (Wheatley 2012), as
were standard fixings in the foreign exchange markets.2 At the time of writing, asset man-
agers are accused in the EU of mis-selling by charging for active management when their
funds simply track an index.3
In short, malpractice is endemic in the financial sector. Zingales (2015, p. 1348) states
that “in the financial sector fraud has become a feature and not a bug.” And, in an industry
that relies upon trust, the systemic consequences of malpractice are potentially profound
(for a discussion, see, e.g., Sapienza and Zingales 2012). Supervisors, rule-makers and com-
mentators are therefore naturally concerned by the causes and implications of such practices.
Several themes emerge from their public statements. First, supervisors increasingly appre-
ciate that they cannot rely solely upon formal regulations to moderate market behaviour;
it is frequently very hard for outsiders to assess actions, and, hence, internal controls and
cultural standards are of critical importance. Those standards are created and transmitted
by the senior members of the organisation. For example, Lord Adair Turner, chairman of
the UK’s financial regulator (the FSA) between 2008 and 2013, stated in a recent interview
that
“bank executives face the challenge of setting clearly from the top a culture which
tells people that there are things they shouldn’t do, even if they are legal, even
if they are profitable and even if it is highly likely that the supervisor will never
spot them.”4
The importance of “tone from the top” to organisational culture is now widely recognised by
supervisors (see also Adamson 2013), and many have concluded that top-down regulation is
an important element of any response to behavioural problems in financial markets.
Second, notwithstanding our increasing appreciation of the social importance of culture
in the financial sector, financial institutions appear frequently to foster dysfunctional cultures
that fail to consider the potentially deleterious social consequences of practices that generate
significant profits. For example, William C. Dudley (2014), President of the Federal Reserve
1See the “super complaint” brought to the UK Competition Commission by the UK’s Citizen’s Advice
Bureau (Tutton and Hopwood Road 2005) and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’s
(2013a, p. 91) report.
2http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-
plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest-rate-cases.html
3https://next.ft.com/content/d0c93bfa-c997-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44
4http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-24/turner-stakes-claim-for-boe-helm-as-bank-
culture-reform-sought
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Bank of New York, argues that regulators and bankers should address “cultural failure,” and
the G30 (2015) suggests that cultural problems were a contributing factor for the financial
crisis; outside the immediate ambit of the regulators, Justin Welbey, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, has spoken at length on this theme.5
Third, there is a growing consensus that executive pay has contributed to cultural prob-
lems in the financial sector. In the specific case of the UK’s PPI mis-sellling scandal, Finan-
cial Services Authority’s (2013, para. 22) written evidence to the Parliamentary Commission
on Banking Standards identifies an excessive concern with targets and bonuses as a root
cause of the mis-selling. Archbishop Welbey notes that individuals are generally more likely
to violate norms of fairness when they are well-paid for doing so,6 while President Dudley
suggests that bonus deferral may be an effective way of changing cultural norms. In an at-
tempt to redress the balance, regulators have imposed significant penalties upon individuals
and firms that can be proved to have violated the law. At the time of writing, the SEC
has launched enforcement actions against 198 entities and individuals, and levied penalties
amounting to almost $2bn, for misconduct in securities markets that led to, or arose from,
the financial crisis: most concerned misrepresentation of pertinent facts about investments.7
Foreign exchange manipulation resulted in fines totalling $10 bn8, and, as at May 2015, fines
resulting from the LIBOR scandal topped $9 bn.9
Fourth, there is widespread agreement that behavioural problems in financial markets
are associated at least in part with moral failings (see, e.g., Graafland and van de Ven
(2011), Luyendijk (2016), Tett (2009), Wilson (2012)). Indeed, recent experimental work by
Cohn, Fehr, and Mare´chal (2014) strongly suggests that bankers are more likely to behave
dishonestly in a professional than a personal context. It seems clear that we cannot consider
bank regulations independently of moral standards.
In this paper, we present a simple economic model within which we can consider the
relationship between ethics, culture and compensation policies. In particular, we exhibit
situations in which a profit-maximising principal chooses to use compensation policy de-
liberately to subvert ethical decision making and to disrupt the transmission of valuable
cultural norms. Our analysis thus requires us to model ethical decision making, to explain
the formation and transmission of cultural values, and to relate both to compensation poli-
cies.
Notwithstanding the apparent ease with which some commentators identify immoral be-
5See, for example, the transcript of his 3rd October 2013 House of Lords speech at
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5150/archbishop-calls-for-culture-
change-at-financial-institutions.
6See the speech cited in note 5, in which Archbishop Welbey draws an explicit connection between
mis-selling and performance bonuses.
7http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml
8https://next.ft.com/content/23fa681c-fe73-11e4-be9f-00144feabdc0
9http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729
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haviour, ethics are essentially contested. Philosophers have been arguing about what is right
for more than two millennia and a variety of rich philosophical analyses promulgate incon-
sistent notions of ethical behaviour. Some philosophers attempt to define ethical behaviour
with reference to what makes a virtuous person (e.g., Aristotle (2009), MacIntyre (2007));
for Aristotle, virtue is inconsistent with many commercial activities. Another perspective,
expressed most famously by Kant (2012 [1785]), identifies right actions by considering the
rights that people have by virtue of their humanity. In contrast to Kant, a utilitarian tra-
dition due initially to Jeremy Bentham (2007 [1789]) identifies right actions entirely with
reference to their aggregate consequences for every affected person.
Economic analysis can shed some light upon the effect that different ethical standards
have upon resource allocation; it cannot adjudicate between different visions of what is good
or right. Our analysis examines the economic consequences of two types of moral standard.
Agents operating under the first subscribe to a version of Bentham’s utilitarianism, under
which an action is right if it maximises total well-being. Utilitarians since Bentham have
considered questions about the distinction between the rightness of an act and of a rule
(see, e.g., Rawls 1955), but our agents define the morality of an action with reference to its
immediate consequences. An agent in our model has higher utilitarian ethical standards to
the extent that he places a higher weight upon the Benthamite utilitarian welfare measure,
and a lower weight upon his own concerns.
This approach lends itself well to an economic model in which actors maximise some-
thing. Indeed, many modern economists tacitly accept Bentham’s ethical stance when they
identify welfare with aggregate surplus. Furthermore, several studies indicate that real-world
managers actually use utilitarian moral standards to resolve ethical dilemmas (see Fritzsche
and Becker (1984), Premeaux and Mondy (1993), Premeaux (2004)10).
We also consider a crude version of Kant’s (2012 [1785]) deontological, or duty, ethics.
Kant argues that actions are properly constrained by duties that exist a priori: that is,
Kantian duties, such as the obligation to tell the truth, reflect duties that exist before we
understand their context, and that do not depend upon their consequences. More generally,
at least some of the time, duty-based ethics forbid us to trade one agent’s well-being against
another’s: for example, Nozick (1974, p. 33) argues that viewing one agent’s suffering as
sufficiently compensated by gain elsewhere “does not sufficiently respect and take account of
the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” We cannot capture all
of the nuances of this reasoning in a simple economic model: we consider instead a simple
approach under which an ethical agent refuses to impose any sort of harm upon another.
10All three papers attempt to infer the philosophical basis upon which managers resolve ethical dilemmas
by examining their written responses to short business vignettes. For example, two of the vignettes asked
the subjects whether they would pay a bribe to enter a new market, and whether they would suppress
evidence that a profitable product was potentially unsafe. Practitioners relied almost entirely upon utilitarian
standards to resolve these questions.
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The moral agents in our model must decide whether or not to adopt a practice that may
harm customers. Some, senior, agents have access to a signal of the harm caused by the
practice. Other, junior, agents have no such signal, but are able to observe the adoption
decision of the senior agent. When they are paid appropriately, we demonstrate that ethical
junior agents copy the adoption decision of their better-informed seniors. They do this
because they believe that their seniors are morally responsible, and because they know that
their seniors are better-informed than they are.
We interpret this type of imitation as cultural assimilation. Culture is a complex and
hard-to-define term. But, in an organisational context, it is widely understood to incorpo-
rate a set of “taken-for-granted-assumptions” (Giorgi, Lockwood, and Glynn 2015) and tacit
norms that are absorbed, possibly unconsciously, through participation in the life of the
organisation (for widely cited discussions of the transmission of cultural norms, see Schein
(2004), Swidler (1986), and Patterson (2014)). The cultural assimilation in our model trans-
mits this type of cultural knowledge.11 The cultural failings to which we refer above arise
when harmful practices are adopted in this way by morally responsible agents.
Whether or not cultural assimilation occurs depends upon the compensation policy of
the principal, which, in turn, depends upon the sophistication of its customers and upon
the ethical standard to which agents hold themselves. We start by analysing equilibria
with sophisticated customers, who anticipate and demand compensation for equilibrium
strategies that harm them. In general, agents must be compensated for violating their ethical
standards. So, when they are utilitarian, they must be paid to induce actions that reduce
aggregate output. Such actions also reduce a sophisticated customer’s willingness to pay.
The consequence in our model is that it is never worth inducing a utilitarian junior agent to
deviate from the senior agent’s action choice. That is, the only equilibrium that our model
admits for utilitarian agents and sophisticated customers features cultural assimilation.
In contrast, there is a trade-off between the needs of sophisticated customers, who can
reflect the costs and benefits of adoption in their willingness to pay, and a duty-based ethical
standard that prohibits the imposition of any ex post harm. In this case, the profit earned by
adopting a surplus-enhancing practice may outweigh the costs of inducing agents to invoke
it. We therefore find that, even with sophisticated agents, the junior agent may not adopt
a practice that the senior agent believes to be acceptable, so that cultural assimilation may
fail.
We consider the contrasting case where customers are na¨ıve: that is, when they fail to
anticipate the potential harm imposed upon them by the agents with whom they deal. This is
a reasonable approximation to the situation in many retail financial sectors and, in particular,
to situations where financial products are mis-sold. In this case, because customers do not
11For an economic model that identifies cultural practice with shared understandings of the rules for
selection amongst multiple equilibria, see Kreps (1990).
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demand compensation for harms imposed upon them, the only brake upon harmful activity
is provided by the agents’ moral scruples. Once again, the precise characteristics of the
equilibrium depend upon the agents’ moral standard. But, precisely because customers do
not charge for surplus-reducing actions, agents invoke harmful practices more often when
their customers are na¨ıve. Moreover, because invocation is profitable for principals, they
seek the cheapest way to encourage it. Hence, they enable cultures that exploit particular
agents’ moral weaknesses. As a result, cultural assimilation need not obtain in equilibrium:
junior agents may prefer always to adopt, or never to do so.
Our analysis is consistent with recent criticisms of compensation contracts in retail fi-
nancial services. In our model, success bonuses in those industries are designed to encourage
agents to set aside their moral concerns, and, at least when agents have utilitarian moral
standards, economic surplus would be increased if they were disallowed. Moreover, because
businesses with na¨ıve consumers make more profits when their employees are morally lax,
our analysis suggests that retail financial businesses have a strong incentive to seek such
employees and to pay them what it takes to ignore their moral scruples. A cap on bonus
payments in those industries would weaken that incentive and, hence, might result in higher
average moral standards amongst retail financial advisors.
Our analysis complements work on compensation and culture in the financial sector. Sev-
eral authors suggested in the wake of the financial crisis that inappropriate compensation
contracts can induce short-termism and so undermine financial stability (e.g., Thanassoulis
(2012, 2013), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), and Efing, Hau, Kampfkotter, and Steinbrecher
(2015)). Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) analyse the relationship between organisational struc-
ture, compensation, and misselling. But no prior work considers either the relationship
between compensation and organisational culture, or the way that compensation and moral
standards interact. And, while economists have modelled culture as a variety of devices
that resolve communication or coordination problems in social life (Kreps (1990), Cre´mer
(1993), Cre´mer, Garicano, and Prat (2004), Carillo and Gromb (1999, 2002), Van den Steen
(2010a, 2010b)), none has shown how cultural learning can be subordinated to an appro-
priately designed compensation contract. Nor are we aware of any work in economics that
combines the study of morals, compensation, and cultural learning.
Our analysis is presented as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 presents
the model solution. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Model
We consider a business run by a profit-maximising principal with a senior agent, s, and a
junior agent, j, who provide a service to customers. For clarity we use female pronouns to
refer to s and male pronouns for j. All of the agents in our model are risk-neutral: the
6
ETHICAL STANDARDS AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
principal and the customers aim to maximise their expected income, and we discuss the
agents’ preferences in Section 2.3 below.
The value v of the service to any customer is v ≡ N (v¯, 1/τv); each time it provides the
service, the business earns a profit pi ∈ {pi, p¯i}, where P [pi = p¯i] = p. We write ∆pi = p¯i − pi.
We study the emergence of a new working practice P for delivering the service. We
write Is, Ij ∈ {0, 1} for the respective decisions of the senior and junior agent to invoke P.
Is and Ij are not verifiable, but the junior agent can observe the senior agent’s adoption
decision. If P is adopted, then it raises the probability that pi = p¯i to p + ∆p < 1. But the
practice could be harmful, in which case it imposes a cost c > 0 on customers. The ex ante
probability that P is harmful is h > 0, and we assume that
c > ∆p∆pi, (1)
so that harmful practices are surplus-reductive. The ex ante expected surplus generated by
P is ∆p∆pi − hc. We write
hˆ , ∆p∆pi
c
; (2)
P is surplus-reductive precisely when h > hˆ.
The senior agent s has a superior understanding of P, because she receives a private
signal σ ∈ [0, 1] of its type before she decides whether to adopt it. σ is drawn from a
distribution with function FH(·) if the practice is harmful, and FL(·) if it is not. We assume
that the corresponding density functions fH(·) and fL(·) exist and are differentiable, and that
fH(σ)/fL(σ) is strictly monotonically increasing in σ. High signals σ are therefore suggestive
of a harmful practice. We assume that fL(1) = 0 = fH(0), so that signals of 0 or 1 reveal
the type of P with certainty.
The junior agent does not receive a signal of the practice’s type, but she observes the
senior agent’s invocation decision Is before she makes her own choice Ij.
2.1 Timings
The timing of the game is as follows.
At time t = 0, the practice P emerges, and the principal offers a remuneration scheme
to the agents. The principal makes take-it-or-leave it fee offers φs and φj to the customers of
the senior and junior agent, respectively. Each agent acquires one customer, who commits
to pay φs or φj for the service.
At time t = 1, the senior agent receives her private signal σ of the practice’s type, and
makes her private invocation decision Is. The junior agent observes Is.
At time t = 2, the junior agent makes his private invocation decision Ij.
At time t = 3, customer benefits and business profits are realised. The time 0 remuner-
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ation contracts are executed.
2.2 Contracts
The profits realised by both agents are verifiable, but customer benefits are not. Agent
contracts are therefore conditional upon the business’ profits. The junior agent moves after
the senior agent and cannot affect her profits. His contract is therefore an ordered pair
(wj, wj), comprising his income in the respective cases where the business realises a high or
a low profit from its customer. The senior agent’s contract is a four-tuple (wsj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj),
describing her income as a function of the profit she and her junior earn: here subscripts
denote low profit, and superscripts denote high profits so that, for example, wsj is the senior
agent’s profit if she earns a profit p¯i and her junior earns profit pi.
2.3 Objective functions and ethical standards
As noted above, the principal aims to maximise the expected profits earned by the business,
and each customer wishes to maximise his or her expected income. Agents are different, in
that we allow them to exhibit concern for the ethical consequences of their actions.
As discussed in the Introduction, ethical values are hard to include in a traditional
economic model. For example, it would be very difficult meaningfully to incorporate ethical
concerns founded upon Aristotelian virtue in a model whose agents maximise an objective
function. Moreover, economic reasoning cannot arbitrate between different visions of the
good; the most we can hope to achieve is to understand the way that agents’ ethical stance
affects the social ordering. We therefore use an approach that allows us to derive results
using standard optimisation methods, and that incorporates in a simple fashion the fact that
some people are more likely than others to consider the ethical consequences of their actions.
For an agent who earns lifetime income w and who provides service valued by customers at
v, we use the following general objective function:
u = (1− ε)w + εe(w, v). (3)
The parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] in Equation (3) measures the strength of agent’s ethical com-
mitment ; the function e represents the agent’s ethical standard, which depends upon w, v
and possibly upon some properties of their distribution. Where necessary, we use s and j
subscripts to distinguish between the senior and junior agents’ ethical commitment.12
12This formulation inevitably rules out some ethical standards. For example, we cannot use it to model
situations in which an agent believes that her customers have misguided preferences. This situation might
arise, for example, if the customers suffer from drug addiction; some writers have suggested that it could be a
consequence of social indoctrination that leaves its subject unable to identify her best interests (Levy 2005).
We do not attempt to address this difficult and important class of problems in our first pass at this topic
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We consider two simple ethical standards, which correspond roughly to two ethical tra-
ditions. First, we consider a classical act utilitarian, who evaluates the ethical worth of an
action by calculating the immediate effect of that action upon each of the affected parties.
We formalise this standard in our model as follows:
Definition 1. An act utilitarian agent uses the following ethical standard to evaluate the
practice P:
eAct , E[surplus due to act]
= E[surplus accruing to bank]− E[cost to customer].
Note that, when assigning ethical worth to a practice, an act utilitarian is unconcerned
with his or her own income per se: the bank surplus in the above definition is gross of any
wage payments. We cite evidence in the Introduction that managers often use act-utilitarian
reasoning when they face real-world ethical dilemmas.
We also present a simple formulation of the type of duty-based (deontological) ethics
discussed in the Introduction. Such ethics prohibit actions that impose certain harms, irre-
spective of their consequences. We identify these ethics in our model with an other-regarding
standard that prohibits actions that harm customers.
Definition 2. An other-regarding agent uses the following duty-based ethical standard to
evaluate the practice P:
eDuty , −E[harm to the customer] (4)
Hence, in line with the discussion in the Introduction, the duty-based ethical standard
embraced by an other-regarding agent does not permit inter-personal utility tradeoffs.
2.4 Equilibrium definition
A strategy in our model is a probability θ that P is invoked.
Definition 3. An equilibrium of the model comprises:
1. Remuneration contracts (wj, wj) and (w
sj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj) between the principal and the
agents;
2. A strategy θs(σ) for the senior agent that depends upon her private signal σ;
3. Strategies θ1j and θ
0
j for the junior agent in the respective cases where the senior agent
does and does not invoke P;
and, of course, we cannot determine whether or not “misguided preferences” exist.
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such that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the other’s, and the remuneration contracts
maximize the principal’s expected income given the agents’ strategies.
3. Game Solution
We solve the game by backward induction, starting in Section 3.1 by characterising the
respective invocation decisions Is and Ij of the senior and junior agents. We rely in our
argument upon the senior agent’s posterior assessment of the probability that P is harmful,
which we denote by η(σ).
Lemma 1 is a consequence of the monotonicity of fH(σ)/fL(σ): a higher signal renders
the senior agent more confident thatP is harmful.
Lemma 1. For any level εs of ethical commitment, the senior agent’s posterior assessment
η(σ) of the probability that P is harmful is increasing in σ.
A senior agent with signal σ expects P to increase aggregate surplus precisely when
η(σ) ≤ hˆ: that is, precisely when
σ ≤ σˆ , η−1(hˆ). (5)
The junior agent updates her priors after observing the senior agent’s invocation decision
and in light of the senior agent’s equilibrium strategy. We write hIj for the junior agent’s
posterior evaluation of the probability that P is harmful after a senior agent invocation
decision I ∈ {0, 1}; for notational simplicity, we sometimes suppress the dependence of hIj
upon the senior agent’s strategy θs (σ). We demonstrate below that, in equilibrium, the
junior agent becomes more convinced of P’s moral worth when Is = 1.
3.1 Agent invocation decisions
Proposition 1, which we prove in the Appendix, demonstrates that both agents adopt an
equilibrium cut-off strategy: the senior agent invokes P precisely when her signal σ is low
enough, and the junior agent involves P when her posterior hIj of the probability that the
practice is harmful is low enough.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the senior and junior agents have respective levels of ethical
commitment εs and εj, and let (w
sj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj) and (w
j, wj) be the respective remuneration
contracts of the senior and junior agents. Let R ∈ {Act,Duty} denote the agents’ ethical
standard.
1. There exists σ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that the senior agent has the following optimal cutoff
strategy:
θs,R(σ) =
1 if σ < σ∗R;0 if σ > σ∗R. (6)
10
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If 0 < σ∗R < 1 then the senior agent is indifferent between invocation and non-invocation
when σ = σ∗R. σ
∗
Duty ≤ σ∗Act, with strict inequality when σ∗Act ∈ (0, 1).
2. For R ∈ {Act,Duty}, define hR as follows:
hR ,
0, R = Duty,hˆ, R = Act. (7)
Let
h∗j,R , hR +
1− εj
εj
∆p
c
(wj − wj). (8)
If agents follow ethical standard R, then, given a senior agent invocation decision I ∈
{0, 1}, the deputy agent has the following cutoff strategy θIj :
θIj =
1, if hIj < h∗j,R;0, if hIj ≥ h∗j,R. (9)
When the ethical standard R ∈ {Act,Duty} is either obvious from the context of the
exposition or unimportant we reduce notational complexity by omitting the R subscript from
θs, σ
∗, hl, and h∗j .
The intuition for Proposition 1, and the interpretation of σ∗, is as follows.
Absent ethical concerns (ε = 0), the senior agent’s decision to invoke P would be com-
pletely determined by her compensation contract. Hence, when ε = 0, either σ∗ = 1 and
invocation always occurs, or σ∗ = 0 and it never does. Any variation in the senior agent’s
invocation choice must derive from her signal σ of the moral worth of P, which can bite
only if she has sufficient ethical commitment εs. Because fH(σ)/fL(σ) is monotone in σ,
the agent is relatively more certain that the practice reduces aggregate surplus for high σ,
and that it is surplus-increasing for low σ. How she responds to this information depends
upon her ethical standard. If she is an act-utilitiarian, then her ethical standard requires
her to invoke P for low σ and not to do so for high σ; it follows that σ∗Act ∈ (0, 1) for high
enough εs. The duty-based standard of Equation (4) requires the agent never to invoke P
if there is any chance that it is harmful to customers; when σ = 0 the practice cannot be
harmful, in which case the other-regarding agent’s invocation decision is determined by her
compensation. Hence, either θs,Duty(0) = 0 and σ
∗
Duty = 0, or θs,Duty(0) = 1, in which case
σ∗Duty > 0. P is always more morally acceptable for act utilitiarians than for other-regarding
agents, so that σ∗Duty ≤ σ∗Act, with strict inequality when σ∗Act ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, the junior agent’s invocation decision depends upon his moral judgement and
his compensation. The former leads him never to invoke P when he has an other-regarding
ethical standard, and, when he adheres to act-utilitarian standards, to do so precisely when
11
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P is expected to increase aggregate surplus. In other words, the ethical standard R ∈
{Act,Duty} requires the junior agent to invoke P precisely when h < hR; Equation (8)
confirms that this rule applies when wj = wj. Differential pay for success and failure
(wj 6= wj) alter the junior agent’s cutoff h∗j,R by 1−εjεj
∆p
c
(wj − wj), and so induce the junior
agent to deviate from the invocation strategy dictated by his ethical standard.
Proposition 1 states that, ceteris paribus, the senior agent is more willing to invoke P
when she has a strong signal of the practice’s moral worth. The junior agent’s posterior
assessment of the likelihood that P is harmful should therefore be lower when the senior
agent invokes the practice than when she does not. Lemma 2 confirms this intuition.
Lemma 2. h1j(σ
∗) ≤ η(σ∗) ≤ h0j(σ∗): that is, after senior agent invocation, the junior
agent’s posterior assessment of the likelihood that P is harmful decreases, while his assess-
ment that P is harmful increases if the senior agent does not invoke the practice.
For R ∈ {Act,Duty}, Lemma 2 allows us to characterise three relevant regions for h∗j,R,
each of which corresponds to a three different cultural norms:
Definition 4. Suppose that the agents have ethical standard R ∈ {Act,Duty}. Then:
1. h∗j,R lies in the rejection region if h
∗
j,R < h
1
j . In this case, the junior agent never invokes
P;
2. h∗j,R lies in the cultural assimilation region if h
1
j ≤ h∗j,R < h0j . In this case, the junior
agent makes the same invocation decision as the senior agent;
3. h∗j lies in the acceptance region if h
0
j ≤ h∗j,R. In that case, the junior agent always
invokes P.
When h∗j,R lies in the rejection and acceptance regions we say that the junior agent accepts
and rejects P, respectively; when h∗j,R lies in the cultural assimilation region we say that the
junior agent’s invocation decision is culturally determined.
Figure 1 illustrates the strategic regions identified in Definition 4 as a function of the
trigger levels σ∗ and h∗j,R. The Figure illustrates the case where h < hˆ so that, ex ante,
P is expected to increase surplus. We demonstrate in the Appendix (Lemma 10) that the
boundaries h0j and h
1
j are increasing functions of σ
∗ with start and end points as illustrated.
To understand the figure, note that, as the senior agent’s trigger value σ∗ increases, she is
more willing to invoke P. It follows that the senior agent’s invocation of P sends a weaker
signal of quality at higher trigger levels σ∗ and, hence, corresponds to a higher junior agent
posterior assessment h1j . Similarly, because the senior agent is more inclined to invoke P at
higher σ∗, her rejection of the practice at higher σ∗ sends a strong signal that the practice
is harmful and, hence, results in a higher posterior junior agent assessment h0j .
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1
h
hˆ
0
h∗j,R
h0j
h1j
η
σˆ
0 σ∗
Acceptance
Cultural
Assimilation
Rejection
1
Figure 1. Junior agent strategy regions. For R ∈ {Act,Duty}, the junior agent’s strategy
depends upon the relationship between the trigger level h∗j,R and the values of h
0
j and h
1
j . In the
acceptance and rejection regions respectively, the junior agent always and never invokes P. In
the cultural assimilation region, the junior agent adopts the same social practices as the senior
agent. The Figure illustrates the case where h < hˆ so that the practice is ex ante expected to be
surplus-enhancing.
In the region between h1j and h
0
j , the junior agent follows the senior agent’s lead, and
accepts precisely those practices that she is prepared to endorse. Hence, for trigger values
(σ∗, h∗j) that fall in this region, the firm exhibits the type of cultural learning that we identify
in the Introduction; even without any personal understanding of the moral status of the
practice P, the junior agent is prepared to adopt it when he sees the senior agent doing so.
The trigger values σ∗ and h∗ are determined endogenously as a function of the ethical com-
mitments εs and εj of the agents, as well as of their compensation contracts (w
sj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj)
and (wj, wj). The principal therefore determines the equilibrium strategies of the agents and,
hence, the cultural norms of the firm; we solve his problem in the following Section.
3.2 The Principal’s Problem
The principal selects remuneration contracts (wj, wj) and (w
sj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj) so as to imple-
ment cut-off values h∗j and σ
∗ and, by extension, determines the relationship between h∗j
and the invocation boundaries
{
h1j(σ
∗), h0j(σ
∗)
}
. These choices therefore determine whether
the junior agent culturally assimilates: that is, follows the senior’s invocation decision. We
assume that the agents are constrained to receive more for high than for low profitability:
wj ≥ wj, wsj ≥ wjs, wsj ≥ wsj. (10)
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This is a natural requirement if the agent can hide or deliberately lower his/her profits.
Lemma 3 is an immediate consequence of Equations (8) and (10):
Lemma 3. For R ∈ {Act,Duty}, the principal can implement any h∗j,R ∈ [hR, 1], where hR
is defined in Equation (7). The cheapest way to do so is to set wj = 0 and
wj = wjR(h
∗
j,R) ,
εj
1− εj
c
∆p
(h∗j − hR). (11)
The principal can use bonus payments to induce agents to set aside their moral objections
to a social practice. But, because agents cannot be paid more for low profits than high
(Equation (10)), bonuses can only induce agents to expand the range of beliefs for which
they adopt the practice beyond the baseline dictated by their moral standard: that is, to
induce junior agents to employ a cut-off above hR. Lemma 3 identifies the cost of doing so.
Corollary 1. An act-utilitiarian junior agent’s trigger level h∗j,Act can lie in the Rejection
region if and only if ex ante P is expected to reduce surplus.
Proof. Equation (8) and the fact that wj ≥ wj together imply that h∗j,Act ≥ hˆ. Then,
because h1j(σ
∗ = 1) = h (see Figure 1 and Lemma 10 in the Appendix), h∗j,Act can lie within
the Rejection region if and only if h > hˆ: that is, if and only if P is surplus-reductive.
Like the junior agent, a senior agent with ethical standard R ∈ {Act,Duty} is guided by
her ethical standard to invoke P precisely when she assigns probability η(σ) < hR that P
is harmful: that is, when Condition (12) is satisfied:
σ < σR ,
0, if R = Duty;σˆ, if R = Act. (12)
Since success payments are constrained weakly to exceed failure payments, the senior agent
can be induced by high enough bonus payments to employ a cut-off that exceeds σR. How-
ever, as Lemma 4 demonstrates, this result is complicated when agents are act-utilitarians by
the possible effect that the senior agent’s invocation decision Is has upon the junior agent’s
choice Ij.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the agents have ethical standard R ∈ {Act,Duty}.
1. The principal can implement any cutoff σ∗ ≥ σR. The cheapest way to do so depends
upon the choice of h∗j as follows:
(a) If h∗j lies in the Cultural Assimilation Region then w
s
j = w
j
s = wsj = 0 and
wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) 1
2p+ ∆p
; (13)
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(b) If h∗j lies in the Acceptance Region then w
j
s = wsj = 0 and w
sj, wsj are selected so
as to satisfy Equation (14):
(p+ ∆p)w
sj + (1− p−∆p)wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) . (14)
(c) If h∗j lies in the Rejection Region then w
j
s = wsj = 0 and w
sj, wsj are selected so as
to satisfy Equation (15):
pwsj + (1− p)wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η (σ∗)− hR) (15)
2. If R = Act, 1− 2p−∆p < 0, and hˆ < h0j , then the principal can implement any cutoff
σ∗ < σˆ by implementing h∗j in the cultural assimilation region, and setting w
sj = wjs =
wsj = 0 and
wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) 1
1− 2p−∆p . (16)
The proof of Lemma 4 appears in the Appendix.
Part 1 of the Lemma is analogous to Lemma 3: it states that the principal can induce
a senior agent with ethical standard R ∈ {Act,Duty} to adopt any cut-off value σ ≥ σR:
in other words, that appropriate success bonus payments can induce the senior agent to
invoke P even when her posterior assessment is that the practice is morally wrong. The
bonus payments are increasing in the width of the range σ ∈ [σR, σ∗] of bad signals that the
principal wishes to induce the senior agent to ignore.
Part 1(a) of the Lemma corresponds to the case where the junior agent’s actions mirror
the senior agent’s. Paying the senior agent for junior agent success therefore heightens the
senior agent’s incentive to invokeP and, hence, the cheapest wage contract compensates the
senior agent only when both agents succeed, as in Equation (13). The cost of inducing the
senior agent to set aside her moral scruples is higher when she is more ethically committed;
hence, the bonus payment wsj is increasing in εs.
Part 1(b) obtains when the junior agent always invokesP. Since the senior agent cannot
affect the junior agent’s behaviour in this case, her bonus is paid conditional upon her own
success, as in Equation (14), and it does not matter how the payments are spread between
the cases where the junior agent does and does not generate a high profit. The probability
weights in Equation (14) reflect the fact that the junior agent always invokes the practice
and so generates a high profit with probability p+ ∆p.
Part 1(c) corresponds to the case where the junior agent rejectsP. As in the Acceptance
case (part 1(b)), the senior agent’s actions in this case cannot influence the junior agent’s
choice, and analogous reasoning applies: payments are once again spread between the cases
where the junior agent does and does not generate high profit. Note the junior agent in this
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case generates a high profit with probability p.
Part 2 of the Lemma applies only when agents are act-utilitarian, and has no analogue for
the junior agent. When it obtains, σ∗ < σˆ, so that the senior agent is induced not to invoke
a morally desirable practice whenever σ∗ ≤ σ < σˆ.13 This can occur only when cultural
assimilation occurs because, if the junior agent were always to invokeP, a senior agent wage
constrained to rise with profits (Equation (10)) can only ever increase adoption rates. By
Lemma 3, it is impossible to implement a junior agent cutoff h∗j below hˆ; cultural assimilation
can therefore be achieved only when hˆ < h0j , as in the statement of the Lemma. Within the
Cultural Assimilation Region paying the senior agent a bonus wsj when both agents succeed
incentivises invocation and so cannot cause the senior agent to reject a surplus-enhancing
practice. It follows that the only lever left to the principal is to reward the senior agent
for low junior agent profit by setting wsj > 0. Doing so has two consequences. On the one
hand, invoking P renders high senior agent profit more likely; on the other, it causes junior
agent invocation, and so reduces the chances of low junior agent profitability. This tradeoff
resolves itself against invocation when the probability (p+ ∆p)(1− p−∆p) of profitabilities
(p¯i, pi) with invocation is less than the corresponding probability p(1 − p) without: that is,
when 1− 2p−∆p < 0, as in the statement of the Lemma.
We are now in a position to determine the principal’s preferred remuneration contracts,
(wj, wj) and (w
sj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj). The principal’s pricing policy can then be determined and,
hence, the principal’s profits. Our results depend upon customer sophistication, which we
characterise in definition 5:
Definition 5. Customers are sophisticated if they correctly anticipate the equilibrium of
the game and are prepared to pay the expected value of their services in that equilibrium.
Customers are na¨ıve if they do not appreciate the consequences of P, and always pay v¯ for
the service.
The principal can use the senior agent’s compensation contract to select a σ∗ value, and
must then decide in which of the regions of Figure 1 to locate the junior agent’s trigger h∗j .
We consider the respective cases where customers are sophisticated and unsophisticated in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.3 Equilibrium with sophisticated customers
We present our analysis for act-utilitarian and other-regarding agents in turn.
13P can never be socially desirable under our version of duty-based ethics: this is the reason that part 2
of the Lemma applies only to act-utilitarians.
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3.3.1 Act-utilitarian agents
Proposition 2. Suppose that the firm’s customers are sophisticated and that agents are act-
utilitarians. Then the principal sets wages equal to the outside option of zero, irrespective
of the state of the world; furthermore, σ∗ = σˆ and the junior agent’s investment decision is
culturally determined.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. The intuition for the result is as follows.
Because sophisticated customers pay exactly their expected income from the firm’s ser-
vice, the principal earns the total expected surplus from service provision, less the expected
value of any wages. The expected surplus is maximised if the senior agent invokes P when-
ever σ ≤ σˆ and the junior agent’s invocation decision is culturally determined. Because every
agent has non-zero ethical commitment, the principal can induce this behaviour by paying
all agents a zero wage. Because this contract maximises surplus and minimises expected
wage payments, it is identified in Proposition 2 as optimal.
Note that, while the principal can achieve higher ex post profits by inducing junior agents
always to accept P, sophisticated customers anticipate the harm imposed upon them by
this policy, and they force the principal to absorb that harm by paying lower prices for the
service.
Lemma 5. When the firm’s clients are sophisticated and agents are act-utilitarians, the
principal’s expected profits are unaffected by the strength of the agents’ ethical commitment.
Lemma 5 is a consequence of the fact that, when customers are sophisticated, the firm
induces the socially optimal investment policy. Since the firm has nothing to gain from
paying its agents to set aside their ethical concerns, the cost of doing so, which depends
upon their ethical commitment ε, is irrelevant.
The agents are optimally paid zero in Proposition 2 because we have normalised their
outside option to zero. If the outside option were positive, the principal would still seek
the cheapest way to ensure that all agents invoke P precisely when σ ≤ σ∗. In this case,
paying a flat wage equal to the outside option will induce a senior agent with positive ethical
commitment to adopt the surplus-maximising invocation policy; in that case, paying the
junior agent a flat wage induces cultural assimilation. Hence, a state-independent wage
remains optimal when the agents are act-utilitarians. Furthermore, the expected cost of any
other compensation scheme cannot be lower and, if compensation is not state-independent, it
can serve to move the agents away from the surplus-maximising adoption policy and, hence,
to lower expected profits.
17
ETHICAL STANDARDS AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
3.3.2 Other-regarding agents
Surplus is maximised with sophisticated customers in Proposition 2 because act-utilitarian
agents do not need to be paid to select the surplus-maximising invocation policy. In contrast,
other-regarding agents who adopt the duty ethical standard of Definition 2 will only invoke
P if they are paid to do so. Consequently, as we demonstrate in Proposition 3, surplus is
not maximised with other-regarding agents.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the firm’s customers are sophisticated and that agents are
other-regarding. Then σ∗Duty < σˆ with η(σ
∗
Duty) < hˆ/(1+εs/2(1+εs)), and the principal uses
bonus contracts with wages above zero for agents whose ethical standards are low enough.
Equilibria with junior agent cultural assimilation, acceptance, and rejection are all possible.
To understand Proposition 3, note that, while surplus is maximised when σ∗ = σˆ, a
σ∗ > 0 can be achieved when agents are other-regarding only by paying success bonuses
that increase in σ∗. The principal earns the expected surplus less the expected wage bill.
A marginal reduction in σ∗ from σˆ has no effect upon surplus, but lowers expected wages.
Hence σ∗Duty < σˆ.
That cultural assimilation, acceptance, and rejection are all feasible in equilibrium with
other-regarding agents is most easily demonstrated with examples.
Cultural assimilation.—Suppose that εs = εj = 0. Then σ
∗ can be achieved with arbitrar-
ily small wage payments. In particular, the surplus-maximising equilibrium of Proposition
2, with σ∗ = σˆ and cultural assimilation can be achieved; it is optimal because it maximises
expected surplus, all of which the principal receives.
Acceptance.—Suppose that εs = 1 and εj = 0. Then the senior agent will never invoke
P: σ∗Duty = 0 and the senior agent is paid zero. In contrast, an arbitrarily small payment can
induce junior agent acceptance. Since the senior agent’s action is uninformative, junior agent
acceptance is surplus-maximising whenever P is ex ante expected to be surplus-enhancing
(i.e., when hˆ > h).
Rejection.—Suppose that εs = 0 and εj = 1. Then junior rejection is inevitable, and an
arbitrarily small bonus induces the senior agent to set σ∗ = σˆ.
Precisely which type of equilibrium obtains with other-regarding agents depends upon
the properties of the density functions fL(·) and fH(·) and, hence, it is not possible in general
to provide a complete equilibrium characterisation away from the neighbourhoods identified
in the above examples. We present complete numerical examples in Section 3.5.1 below.
In contrast to the case with act-utilitarian agents, the principal makes higher profits
when its agents are less ethically committed:
Lemma 6. When the firm’s clients are sophisticated and agents are other-regarding, the
principal’s profit is diminishing in the strength of the agents’ ethical commitment.
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To understand Lemma 6, recall that other-regarding agents are required by their moral
standard never to invoke P and, hence, do so only when their success bonus is large enough
to overwhelm their moral qualms. The required scale of the bonus is lower, and the cutoff
σ∗Duty is higher, when the agents are less ethically committed. Hence, lowering agents’ ethical
commitment serves both to lower the expected wage bill for a given level of surplus and, by
raising σ∗Duty, to raise surplus. Both effects serve to increase the principal’s expected profit.
The principal in our model makes a take-it-or-leave it offer to the customer, who is
therefore indifferent over the agent’s ethical standard. But we could extend our analysis to
allow for surplus to be ex-ante shared between the principal and the customer. If we were
to do so, then Lemma 6 demonstrates that, faced with other-regarding agents, sophisticated
customers would have a positive preference for less ethical agents. This situation can be
thought of as one in which ethical agents attempt to look out for the customer’s best interests
by refusing to inflict any harm upon him. A sophisticated customer may (correctly) believe
that he is better placed to assess his expected well-being than his market counterparties and,
hence, may prefer to deal with agents who do not even consider his well-being.
3.4 Equilibrium with na¨ıve investors
We now consider a firm whose customers are na¨ıve and, hence, pay v¯ for the firm’s service,
irrespective of whether P is invoked. Once again, we consider act-utilitarian and other-
regarding agents in turn.
3.4.1 Act-utilitarian agents
In order to present our formal result as succinctly as possible, we introduce some new nota-
tion, and we define a new formal term. First, we define the ethical power Ei ∈ <≥0 ∪{∞} of
agent i ∈ {s, j} to be the following transformation of the agent’s ethical commitment:
Ei ,
εi
1− εi . (17)
Second, we say that the agents’ ethical powers are limited by (κs, κj) ≥ (0, 0) precisely when
Es
κs
+
Ej
κj
≤ 1. (18)
Ethical limits place an upper bound upon the agents’ ethical powers as illustrated in Figure
2.
We can now state our main result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that agents are act-utilitarians and that the firm’s customers are
na¨ıve. Then the principal selects σ∗Act ≥ σˆ. There exist ethical constraints KAss = (κAsss , 0),
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Es
Ej
κj
κs
Figure 2. Ethical limits. Agents whose ethical powers are limited by (κs, κj) have ethical powers
(Es,Ej) that lie within the shaded region.
KAcc = (κAccs , κ
Acc
j ) and K
∗ = (κ∗s, κ
∗
j) such that:
1. The optimal σ∗Act in the Cultural Assimilation Region is greater than σˆ if (Es,Ej) are
limited by KAss;
2. The optimal σ∗Act in the Acceptance Region is greater than σˆ if (Es,Ej) are limited by
KAcc;
3. The optimal σ∗Act in the Rejection Region is strictly greater than σˆ;
4. The principal induces the junior agent to accept P if and only if (Es,Ej) are limited by
K∗.
The proof of the Proposition appears in the Appendix, along with expressions for KAss,
KAcc and K∗. Its intuition is as follows.
When customers are na¨ıve, they do not charge the firm for the harm that they anticipate
from P. It is therefore in the principal’s interest that P be implemented; only the moral
concerns of the agents prevent this from happening. The principal can overcome those
concerns by paying a sufficiently high success bonus to the agents; the scale of the necessary
bonus reflects the moral concerns of the agents. When the junior agent’s actions are culturally
determined, the principal need only pay the senior agent: the cost of incentivising σ∗Act > σˆ
therefore reflects only the senior agent’s moral power, so that it is worth setting σ∗Act > σˆ
only for ethical limits of the form KAss in Proposition 4. In contrast, in the Acceptance
region, as well as inducing the senior agent to set aside her moral scruples, the principal
must also compensate the junior agent for doing so. It is more expensive to incentivise the
junior agent to accept P when σ∗Act is high, because the senior agent’s invocation decision is
then less informative; the necessary limits on (Es,Ej) therefore have the form of KAcc. If the
practice is ex ante expected surplus-reductive then compensation contracts that implement
the Rejection Region for the junior agent exist. These require the junior agent to reject a
practice even when the senior agent has accepted it. This is possible only if the senior agent
is willing to implement surplus-reductive practices: that is, if σ∗Act > σˆ.
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Finally, the principal decides whether to force junior agent acceptance by trading off the
extra profits thereby achieved against the costs of persuading the junior agent to ignore the
senior agent’s actions. The latter costs are low, and the principal forces acceptance, when
the agents’ ethical powers are sufficiently limited, as in part 4 of the Proposition.
We have established that with na¨ıve consumers the principal will choose to set a trigger
for the senior agent σ∗Act ≥ σˆ with strict inequality for sufficiently ethically limited agents.
Because it is harder to induce ethically committed agents to accept a harmful practice, those
agents receive higher bonuses and, hence, generate lower profits for the firm. Lemma 7, which
is proved in the Appendix, confirms this intuition.
Lemma 7. Suppose that the firm’s clients are na¨ıve and that agents are act-utilitarians.
Then the principal’s expected profits are declining in the strength of the ethical commitment
of the agents.
It follows that a firm with na¨ıve consumers and act-utilitarian agents prefers to hire
agents with low ethical power. The principal benefits by incentivising the senior agent to
invoke practices whose expected surplus is overall negative. The lower the senior’s ethical
commitment, the cheaper this is.
Our analysis identifies three mechanisms by which act-utilitarian agents can be incen-
tivised to invoke surplus-reductive practices. If the practice is ex ante expected to be surplus-
reductive then the principal could implement the Rejection Region for the junior and incen-
tivise senior agent adoption. This approach is optimal when the junior agent is sufficiently
ethically committed. If the practice is ex ante surplus-enhancing, or if it is surplus-reductive
and the junior agent is not too ethically committed, then the principal has two choices.
First, she can induce cultural assimilation, and reward the senior agent only when both
senior and junior agents are successful: that is, with a bonus based on the whole team’s
performance. Second, it could incentivise the junior agent always to adopt P, by paying a
bonus to the junior that could exceed the senior agent’s bonus, which, if it is non-zero, is
contingent only upon the senior agent’s profitability. The second approach is preferred when
both agents have sufficiently low ethical commitment; the first is adopted for intermediate
levels of ethical commitment. In general, as stated in Lemma 7, all wages fall as the agents’
ethical commitments fall.
3.4.2 Other-regarding agents
As stated in Proposition 3, cultural assimilation, acceptance, and rejection are all possible for
other-regarding agents even when their customers are sophisticated. In that case, customers
reduce their willingness to pay in response to surplus-reducing actions. Hence, because it
is expensive to induce higher σ∗Duty, it is always the case with sophisticated customers that
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σ∗Duty ≤ σˆ.
In contrast, surplus-reducing actions have no effect upon na¨ıve customers’ willingness
to pay. Hence, because a higher σ∗Duty raises firm profitability, σ
∗
Duty > σˆ is possible when
customers are na¨ıve. We have therefore proved the following result:
Proposition 5. Suppose that the firm’s customers are na¨ıve and that agents are other-
regarding. Then equilibria with junior agent cultural assimilation, acceptance, and rejection
are all possible. Any σ∗Duty ∈ [0, 1] is possible.
Finally, we have the following analogue of Lemma 7:
Lemma 8. When the firm’s clients are na¨ıve and agents are other-regarding, the principal’s
profit is diminishing in the strength of the agent’s ethical commitment.
3.5 Numerical example
Equilibria with other-regarding agents cannot be fully characterised analytically, because
they depend upon the specific properties of the density functions fL and fH . This section
presents our model’s equilibria for a specific case with other-regarding agents.
We consider density functions fH(σ) = 2σ and fL(σ) = 2(1 − σ) and set the prior
probability h that P is harmful to 1
2
. This yields η(σ∗) = σ∗, h1j(σ
∗) = σ∗/2, and h0j(σ
∗) =
(σ + 1)/2. We also set hˆ = 0.6 > h = 1/2, so that P is ex-ante surplus-enhancing.
3.5.1 Sophisticated customers and other-regarding agents
Figure 3 illustrates equilibria with sophisticated customers and other-regarding agents. The
discussion after Proposition 3 demonstrates that, in this case, cultural assimilation occurs
when εj = εs = 0, that junior agent acceptance occurs when εj = 0 and εs = 1, and that
junior agent rejection occurs when εj = 1 and εs = 0. Figure 3a confirms that this is the
case with our example distribution functions: rejection occurs in the black region, cultural
assimilation in the grey region, and acceptance in the white region.
Figure 3b plots the senior agent’s cut-off signal σ∗Duty as a function of εj and εs; recall
that the senior agent invokes P when σ < σ∗Duty. Invocation never occurs for high enough
s.
The comparative statics of σ∗Duty with respect to ethical commitment are clear from Figure
3b when σ∗Duty is positive. First, consider the case where junior agents reject P; this occurs
for low εs and high εj. Since the senior agent’s action does not affect the junior agent’s
invocation decision within this region, σ∗Duty is unaffected by εj; since a less ethical agent
is more willing to invoke P, the cutoff signal σ∗Duty is decreasing in εs. Now consider the
cultural assimilation region, which occurs for low εs and εj. Once again, σ
∗
Duty is decreasing
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(a) Junior agent equilibrium behaviour (b) Cut-off signal σ∗Duty
Figure 3. Sophisticated customers and other-regarding agents. Figure 3a illustrates the
junior agent’s equilibrium response to the senior agent’s invocation decision. For the parameter
values coloured black at the top left of the Figure, the junior agent always rejects P, and for
parameters coloured white at the bottom right the junior agent always accepts P. Within the
grey parameter region, cultural assimilation occurs, and the junior agent follows the senior agent’s
invocation decision. Figure 3b plots the senior agent’s cutoff signal σ∗Duty as a function of the ethical
commitment εs and εj of the senior and junior agents.
in εs within this region. But, as illustrated in Figure 3b, σ
∗
Duty is also decreasing in εj in the
cultural assimilation region. This follows because the senior agent’s invocation decision is
mirrored within the cultural assimilation region by the junior agent. But an other-regarding
junior agent is required by his moral standard never to invoke P; he therefore does so only
if he receives a sufficiently large bonus. The required size of that bonus is increasing in εj
and, hence, so too is the total cost to the principal of inducing invocation. As a result, the
principal implements a lower σ∗Duty when εj is higher.
Note that σ∗Duty is discontinuous across the border between the cultural assimilation and
acceptance regions. The reason is that, as the firm moves from the cultural assimilation
region to the rejection region, it no longer spends anything inducing invocation by the junior
agent. It therefore becomes cheaper to induce the senior agent to invoke P for a given
ethical commitment εs; as a result, the principal is more willing to induce invocation so that,
as illustrated in Figure 3b, σ∗Duty increases at the border between the two regions.
3.5.2 Na¨ıve customers and other-regarding agents
Figure 4 is the analogue of Figure 3 in the case where customers are na¨ıve: Figure 4a indicates
for each (εj, εs) pair whether an acceptance, rejection, or cultural assimilation equilibrium
obtains, and Figure 4b illustrates the senior agent’s cutoff σ∗Duty for P invocation as a
function of εs and εj.
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(a) Junior agent equilibrium behaviour (b) Cut-off signal σ∗Duty
Figure 4. Na¨ıve customers and other-regarding agents. Figure 4a illustrates the junior
agent’s equilibrium response to the senior agent’s invocation decision. For the parameter values
coloured black at the top left of the Figure, the junior agent always rejects P, and for parameters
coloured white at the bottom right the junior agent always accepts P. Within the grey parameter
region, cultural assimilation occurs, and the junior agent follows the senior agent’s invocation deci-
sion. Figure 4b plots the senior agent’s cutoff signal σ∗Duty as a function of the ethical commitment
εs and εj of the senior and junior agents.
The intuition for the shapes of Figures 4a and 4b is similar to that of Figures 3a and
3b. However, because na¨ıve customers do not charge for expected harm, it is cheaper to
induce invocation. As a result, the acceptance region in Figure 4a is much larger than the
corresponding region in Figure 3a. And for low εs and εj, cultural assimilation amounts
to automatic invocation by the senior agent, followed by assimilation by the junior agent.
Hence, in this region of the cultural assimilation region, σ∗Duty = 1, as illustrated in Figure
4b.
4. Conclusion
We present a model in which morally aware agents decide whether to invoke a social practice
that may harm their customers. They are motivated partly by their moral standards, and
partly by their compensation contract, which is designed by an amoral profit-maximising
principal. Our analysis relates compensation contracts, ethical standards, and organisational
profitability.
Cultural assimilation occurs in our model when junior agents opt to follow the invocation
decision of their senior colleagues. Hence, the importance of “tone from the top” emerges
naturally in our set-up. In our model, the tone that emerges at the top of the organisation
is determined partly by the ethical standards of the organisation’s senior employees, and
partly by their wage contract. The wage contract is affected in turn by sophistication of the
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organisation’s customer base. When customers are sufficiently sophisticated to figure out the
effects of compensation policies, they penalise the firm for surplus-reductive activities. As a
result, firms with sophisticated customers and utilitarian agents leave their employees free to
exercise their moral judgement, and, in expectation, they serve client interests effectively. In
contrast, left to their own devices, other-regarding agents would not maximise surplus and,
hence, they receive equilibrium bonuses, which are designed to induce invocation as close as
possible to the surplus-maximising policy as is cost-effective.
In contrast, na¨ıve customers are unable to penalise bad behaviour, so that a profit-
maximising principal attempts to induce its agents to set aside their moral scruples; in our
set-up, they do this in pursuit of success bonuses. One of the equilibria that arises with na¨ıve
consumers retains cultural assimilation, but does so with perverse senior agent incentives, so
that the tone from the top encourages harmful social practices whenever they are sufficiently
profitable.
Our analysis sheds further light upon the United Kingdom’s PPI mis-selling scandal,
which we outline in the Introduction. The evidence concerning PPI strongly suggests that
it was costly and pointless for most customers, but valuable for a few. The aggressive
sales techniques documented by the CAB and the Banking Standards Commission were a
profitable but potentially socially very damaging practice. Precisely because customers were
na¨ıve, it was particularly important that this practice be tempered by the moral sensibilities
their financial advisors. And yet, in line with our model, it appears that compensation
schemes and sales cultures were designed actively to undermine those sensibilities.
PPI selling bonuses appear to have been in sharp contradistinction to those deployed in
the optimal contracting literature, which are designed to provide incentives that overcome a
moral hazard problem that arises when managerial effort is not subject to contract. Giving
managers “skin in the game” in this situation can move outcomes closer to the first best; in
our model, doing so serves only to undermine managers’ natural inclination to protect their
customers. When values are important and customers are na¨ıve, skin in the game could be
harmful.14
We do not claim that performance-related payment is never justifiable in retail businesses
whose customers are na¨ıve. But our analysis does at least suggest that the decision to use
such payments should be weighed against the possible effects that they may have upon
14This analysis may go some way towards resolving confusion expressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury,
Justin Welbey, during oral submissions by the Group Chief Executive and Group Chairman of HSBC Hold-
ings to the UK’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. On that occasion, Archbishop Welbey
said “We do not give skin in the game to civil servants, surgeons or teachers; there is a whole range of
people who do not have that. It seems to me that you are running what you quite rightly describe as, and
are putting huge effort into, a values-based organisation, with a strong values-based culture. Yet, at the
end of the day, particularly for your most senior staff who are most important as regards setting values and
culture, you seem to be saying that the only way you can motivate them to any significant extent is with
cash, deferred or otherwise.” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 2013b)
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ethical decisions and the cultural context within which they are made. When retail financial
services firms pay profit bonuses to sales people, they may undermine ethical standards
in two ways: first, by encouraging employees to ignore their ethical concerns; and second,
through their long term effect upon an employee pool in which it is cheapest to induce the
desired tone-at-the-top amongst ethically uncommitted workers.
This reasoning suggests that optimal financial regulation is predicated upon the sophis-
tication of the customer base. Customers who understand the impact that high-powered
incentive schemes have upon the quality of service that they receive respond through the
price system; principals are thus induced to nurture and to harness the ethical sensibilities
of their employees. Bonus contracts here are designed to overcome the moral qualms of
agents with other-regarding ethical standards, and will result in insufficient invocation from
the perspective of an aggregate surplus maximising regulator. Against that backdrop, regu-
lation can restrict itself to basic disclosure and anti-fraud provisions. But when customers
lack the sophistication to understand the incentives that their counterparties face, or do not
have the market power adequately to respond to those incentives, a more interventionist
approach may be required and, in particular, direct regulation of compensation structures
may be appropriate. This prescription is complicated by the facts that, first, it is hard in
many cases for an outsider the gauge a customer’s sophistication; and, second, that harmful
practices of omission are far harder to detect in practice than those of commission. We leave
a complete analysis of this problem for future work.
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APPENDIX
We use the following technical result to prove several of our main results.
Lemma 9. For every 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
FL(σ)
FH(σ)
≥ fL(σ)
fH(σ)
≥ 1− FL(σ)
1− FH(σ) . (19)
Proof. By assumption, fL(s)/fH(s) is declining in s. It follows that, for every a > 0,
fL(s+ a) ≤ fL(s)
fH(s)
fH(s+ a). (20)
Integrating Equation (20) over a ∈ [0, 1− s] yields the following expression:∫ 1
s
fL(t)dt ≤ fL(s)
fH(s)
∫ 1
s
fH(t)dt,
or
1− FL(s)
1− FH(s) ≤
fL(s)
fH(s)
.
The other inequality is derived by integrating equation (20) over a ∈ [−s, 0].
Proof of Lemma 1.
Given a signal σ, the senior agent assesses probability η(σ) that P is harmful, where
η(σ) , P [P harmful|σ] = P [σ|P harmful]P [P harmful]
P [σ]
=
hfH(σ)
hfH(σ) + (1− h)fL(σ)
=
1
1 + 1−h
h
fL(σ)
fH(σ)
. (21)
Then, because fL(σ)/fH(σ) is monotonically decreasing in σ, η(σ) is increasing in σ.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by proving part 2 of the Proposition. It is convenient to define 1A to be 1 if agents
are act-utilitiarian, and to be 0 otherwise.
After the senior agent’s invocation decision I ∈ {0, 1}, let hIj be the junior agent’s pos-
terior assessment of the probability that P is harmful. Then his expected utility from not
invoking P is
u1j , (1− εj)(pwj + (1− p)wj) + εj1A(pi + p∆pi + v¯),
and from doing so is
u1j , (1− εj)
(
(p+ ∆p)w
j + (1− p−∆p)wj
)
+ εj
(
1A(pi + (p+ ∆p)∆pi + v¯)− hIjc
)
.
Hence, the junior agent invokes P precisely when u1j ≥ u0j ; this requirement reduces to
Conditions (8) and (9).
We now prove the first part of the Proposition. The senior agent derives the following
utility from not invoking P:
u0s , (1− εs)
[(
1− I0j
) (
wsjp2 + (wsj + w
j
s)p(1− p) + wsj(1− p)2
)
+ I0j
(
wsjp(p+ ∆p) + w
s
jp(1− p−∆p)
+wjs(1− p)(p+ ∆p) + wsj(1− p)(1− p−∆p)
)]
+ εs1A (pi + p∆pi + v¯)
= (1− εs)
[
wsjp2 + (wsj + w
j
s)p(1− p) + wsj(1− p)2
+ I0j ∆p
(
(wsj − wsj)p+ (wjs − wsj)(1− p)
)]
+ εs1A (pi + p∆pi + v¯) ,
where I1j is 1 if h
1
j ≤ h∗j and 0 otherwise, and I0j is defined similarly. The senior agent derives
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the following utility from invoking P:
u1s , (1− εs)
[(
1− I1j
) (
wsj(p+ ∆p)p+ w
s
j(p+ ∆p)(1− p)
+ wjs(1− p−∆p)p+ wsj(1− p−∆p)(1− p)
)
+ I1j
(
wsj(p+ ∆p)
2 + (wsj + w
j
s)(p+ ∆p)(1− p−∆p)
+ wsj(1− p−∆p)2
)]
+ εs (1A(pi + (p+ ∆p)∆pi + v¯)− η(σ)c)
= (1− εs)
[
wsjp(p+ ∆p) + w
s
j(p+ ∆p)(1− p)
+ wjs(1− p−∆p)p+ wsj(1− p−∆p)(1− p)
+ I1j ∆p
(
(wsj − wsj)(p+ ∆p) + (wjs − wsj)(1− p−∆p)
)]
+ εs (1A(pi + (p+ ∆p)∆pi + v¯)− η(σ)c)
The senior agent will choose to invoke P precisely when u1s − u0s ≥ 0. This requirement
reduces to Condition (22):
∆p
[
wsj
(
p+ I1j ∆p + p(I
1
j − I0j )
)
+ wsj
(
1− p− I1j ∆p − p(I1j − I0j )
)
+ wjs
(−p− I1j ∆p + (1− p)(I1j − I0j ))+ wsj (−1 + p+ I1j ∆p − (1− p)(I1j − I0j ))]
≥ εs
1− εs (η(σ)c− 1A∆p∆pi) (22)
It follows immediately that ∂
∂σ
(u1s − u0s) = −εscη′(σ). Hence, because η(σ) is increasing in
σ, the benefit to the senior agent of invoking P is decreasing in σ. The result follows. Note
that σ∗Act is guaranteed to lie between 0 and 1 for high enough εs. This follows immediately
from the observation that [∆p∆pi − η(σ)c] is positive when σ = 0 and, by Assumption (1),
negative when σ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The following expressions are an immediate consequence of Bayes’ Law:
h1j =
1
1 + 1−h
h
FL(σ∗)
FH(σ∗)
; h0j =
1
1 + 1−h
h
1−FL(σ∗)
1−FH(σ∗)
. (23)
Then η(σ∗) ≥ h1j if and only if
hFH(σ
∗)
hFH(σ∗) + (1− h)FL(σ∗) ≤
hfH(σ
∗)
hfH(σ∗) + (1− h)fL(σ∗) .
This expression reduces to FH(σ
∗)/FL(σ∗) ≤ fH(σ∗)/fL(σ∗), which is true by Lemma 9.
That η(σ∗) ≤ h0j follows similarly.
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We can now prove Lemma 10, which establishes the properties of the junior agent’s
strategic regions that are illustrated in Figure 1:
Lemma 10.
1. h0j(σ
∗) is increasing in σ∗ with h0j(0) = h and h
0
j(1) = 1;
2. h1j(σ
∗) is increasing in σ∗ with h1j(0) = 0 and h
1
j(1) = h;
3. η(σ∗) increases from η(0) = 0 to η(1) = 1.
Proof. All of the results of Lemma follow from Equations (21), (23), and the assumption
that fL(1) = 0 = fH(0).
Proof of Lemma 4.
Assume first that η(σ∗)−hR > 0, as in part 1 of the Lemma. Any σ∗ satisfies Condition (22)
with equality. It is convenient to establish the following general expression for the principal’s
expected senior agent wage bill:
E[w] = Fh(σ∗)
[
wsj(p+ ∆p)(p+ I
1
j ∆p) + w
s
j (p+ ∆p)(1− p− I1j ∆p)
+ wjs(1− p−∆p)(p+ I1j ∆p) + wsj(1− p−∆p)(1− p− I1j ∆p)
]
+ (1− Fh(σ∗))
[
wsjp(p+ I0j ∆p) + w
s
jp(1− p− I0j ∆p)
+ wjs(1− p)(p+ I0j ∆p) + wsj(1− p)(1− p− I0j ∆p)
]
= wsjp(p+ I0j ∆p) + w
s
jp(1− p− I0j ∆p) + wjs(1− p)(p+ I0j ∆p) + wsj(1− p)(1− p− I0j ∆p)
+ Fh(σ
∗)∆p
[
wsj
(
p+ I1j ∆p + p(I
1
j − I0j )
)
+ wsj
(
1− p− I1j ∆p − p(I1j − I0j )
)
+ wjs
(−p− I1j ∆p + (1− p)(I1j − I0j ))+ wsj (−1 + p+ I1j ∆p − (1− p)(I1j − I0j ))] , (24)
The term that is multiplied by Fh(σ
∗) in Equation (24) corresponds to the case where
P is invoked. In this case, Condition (22) holds with equality, so that we can re-write the
expected wage as
E[w] = wsjp(p+ I0j ∆p) + wsjp(1− p− I0j ∆p) + wjs(1− p)(p+ I0j ∆p)
+ wsj(1− p)(1− p− I0j ∆p) +
εs
1− εs c (η(σ
∗)− hR)Fh(σ∗) (25)
For part 1(a), note that when h1j ≤ h∗j < h0j we have I1j = 1 and I0j = 0, so that the
principal selects (wsj, wsj , w
j
s, wsj) so as to minimize the following expected wage bill, subject
to the constraints wsj ≥ wjs, wsj ≥ wsj, wjs ≥ 0, and wsj ≥ 0:
E[w] =
(
wsjp2 + (wsj + w
j
s)p(1− p) + wsj(1− p)2
)
+
εs
1− εs c (η(σ
∗)− hR)Fh(σ∗). (26)
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This problem yields the following Lagrangian:
L = − (wsjp2 + (wsj + wjs)p(1− p) + wsj(1− p)2)− εs1− εs c (η(σ∗)− hR)Fh(σ∗)
+ λ
[
(1− εs)∆p
(
wsj(2p+ ∆p) + (w
s
j + w
j
s)(1− 2p−∆p)− wsj(2− 2p−∆p)
)
+ εs(hR − η(σ∗))] + µsj(wsj − wjs) + µsj(wsj − wsj) + µjswjs + µsjwsj. (27)
The first order conditions for the principal’s problem are as follows:
∂L
∂wsj
= −p2 + λ(1− εs)∆p(2p+ ∆p) + µsj = 0; (28)
∂L
∂wsj
= −p(1− p) + λ(1− εs)∆p(1− 2p−∆p) + µsj = 0; (29)
∂L
∂wjs
= −p(1− p) + λ(1− εs)∆p(1− 2p−∆p)− µsj + µjs = 0; (30)
∂L
∂wsj
= −(1− p)2 − λ(1− εs)∆p(2− 2p−∆p)− µsj + µsj = 0. (31)
Suppose that µsj = 0. Then Equation (31) implies that µ
s
j < 0, which is impossible. Hence
µsj > 0 and, by complementary slackness, wsj = 0.
Now subtract Equation (30) from Equation (29) to get µsj + µ
sj = µjs. If µ
sj = 0 then
setting µsj = µ
j
s = 0 generates a contradiction from Equations (28) and (29) (except in a
knife-edge case). So if wsj > 0 we must have wsj = w
j
s = 0.
Similarly, if µsj = 0 we must have µ
sj = µjs > 0, so that, if w
s
j > 0, we must have
wsj = wjs = 0.
If wsj > 0 then it follows from Equation (22) (which holds with equality) that wsj is
given by Equation (13), and from Equation (26) that the expected wage payment to the
senior agent is given by expression (32):
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR)
(
p2
2p+ ∆p
+ ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
. (32)
Similarly, if wsj > 0 then w
s
j is given by Equation (16) and the expected wage payment
to the senior agent is as follows:
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR)
(
p(1− p)
1− 2p−∆p + ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
. (33)
The expected wage payment is lower when wsj > 0 if and only if expression (32) is less than
expression (33). For 1−2p−∆p > 0 this requirement reduces to p > 0. But if 1−2p−∆p < 0,
wsj < 0 (since, by assumption, η(σ
∗)− hR) > 0), which is impossible: it follows that, even in
this case, the principal sets wsj > 0, as in the statement of the Lemma.
For part 1(b) of the Lemma, note that when h1j < h
0
j < h
∗
j we have I
1
j = I
0
j = 1, so that
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Equation (22) yields
(p+ ∆p)(w
sj − wjs) + (1− p−∆p)(wsj − wsj) =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) .
This expression and Equation (10) together imply that wjs = wsj = 0 and that w
sj, wsj satisfy
Equation (14).
For part 1(c) of the Lemma, note that in the rejection region we have h∗j < h
1
j < h
0
j and
so I1j = I
0
j = 0. Equation (22) therefore yields the requirement that
p
(
wsj − wjs
)
+ (1− p) (wsj − wsj) = εs1− εs c∆p (η (σ∗)− hR)
As this requirement can remain satisfied by lowering wsj and wsj by equal amounts, Equation
(10) implies wsj = 0; similarly, w
j
s = 0. Hence we have (15).
Part 2 of the Lemma corresponds to the case where h1j ≤ h∗j < h0j and 1 − 2p −∆p < 0
so that, as above, the expected wage bill is cheaper with wsj > 0 than with w
sj > 0. When
η(σ∗) < hˆ, Equation (22) yields a positive value for wsj , so that this payment is feasible.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
We write R ∈ {Act,Duty} for the agents’ ethical standard. The principal sets the customer’s
fees via a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The principal’s profits are therefore ΠS,R , S −WR, where
S and WR are the equilibrium expected surplus and the expected wage bill, respectively
and the S subscript indicates that customers are sophisticated. We proceed by computing
the optimal contract conditional upon cultural assimilation, acceptance, and rejection; we
then compare the principal’s expected profit from each contract. Our analysis generates a
number of interim Lemmas that we use to prove Propositions 2 and 3.
Cultural Assimilation Region.—In the cultural assimilation region, we have
S Ass = 2(pi + v¯ + (p+ ∆pFh(σ
∗))∆pi − hcFH(σ∗)). (34)
The consumer anticipates that the practice is harmful with probability h, in which case
each agent will invoke the practice with probability FH (σ
∗). The consumer is therefore
willing to pay at most v¯ − hcFH (σ∗) for the service, as in Equation (34). Note that using
η(σ)fh(σ) = hfH(σ) we have
∂SAss
∂σ∗ = 2fh(σ
∗)c
(
hˆ− η(σ∗)
)
, which is positive for σ∗ < σˆ,
zero when σ∗ = σˆ, and negative for σ∗ > σˆ.
Wages depend upon the ethical standard, R. By Lemma 3, act-utilitarians must have
h∗j,Act ≥ hAct = hˆ; the principal can therefore locate the junior agent in the Cultural Assim-
ilation Region when R = Act by setting h∗j,Act = hˆ and paying a state-independent wage of
zero. In contrast, when agents are other-regarding, any h∗J,Duty ≥ 0 can be implemented,
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and, by Equation (11), the associated wage wjDuty(h
∗
j,Duty) is increasing in h
∗
j,Duty. It follows
from inspection of Figure 1 that the cheapest way to locate an other-regarding junior agent
in the Cultural Assimilation Region is to set h∗j,Duty = h
1
j(σ
∗). This reasoning yields the
following expression for expected junior agent wage:
W Assj,R =
0, R = Act;εj
1−εj
c
∆p
h1j(σ
∗)(p+ ∆pFh(σ∗)), R = Duty.
(35)
Equations (32) and (33) then yield the following expression for the senior agent’s expected
wage:
W Asss,R =

εs
1−εs
c(η(σ∗)−hR)
∆p
(
p2
2p+∆p
+ ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
, R = Duty or R = Act and σ∗ ≥ σˆ;
εs
1−εs
c(η(σ∗)−hˆ)
∆p
(
p2(1−p)
1−2p−∆p + ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
, R = Act, σ∗ < σˆ and 1− 2p−∆p < 0.
(36)
Lemma 11. Suppose that agents are act-utilitarian and that cultural assimilation is to be
implemented. Then the principal optimally sets σ∗Act = σˆ and pays both agents a state-
independent wage of 0.
Proof. W Asss,Act is increasing in σ
∗ for σ∗ > σˆ and decreasing for σ∗ < σˆ. Since S Ass is
maximised at σ = σ∗, it follows that, conditional upon opting for the cultural assimilation
region, the principal optimally sets σ∗Act = σˆ; Equations (35) and (36) then imply that both
agents receive a state-independent wage of zero.
Lemma 12. Suppose that agents are other-regarding and that cultural assimilation is to be
implemented. Then the principal optimally sets σ∗Duty < σˆ and
η(σ∗Duty) <
hˆ
1 + 1
2
εs
1−εs
. (37)
Proof. Since W AssDuty is increasing in σ
∗ and S Ass is maximised at σˆ, we must have σ∗Duty < σˆ.
If εs and εj are not too high then it is cost-effective for the principal to set σ
∗
Duty > 0, so that
the senior agent suppresses his moral concerns for some signals σ. When this is the case, the
first order condition for the principal’s problem is
2fh(σ
∗)
(
hˆ− η(σ∗)
(
1 +
1
2
εs
1− εs +
1
2
εj
1− εj
h1j (σ
∗)
η(σ∗)
))
=
εs
1− εs
1
∆p
(
p2
2p+ ∆p
+ ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
∂η
∂σ
(σ∗) +
εj
1− εj
1
∆p
(p+ ∆pFh(σ
∗))
∂h1j
∂σ
(σ∗). (38)
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The right hand side of Equation (38) is positive and h1j(σ
∗) < η(σ∗), so that
hˆ > η(σ∗)
(
1 +
1
2
(
εs
1− εs +
εj
1− εj
h1j(σ
∗)
η(σ∗)
))
> η(σ∗)
(
1 +
1
2
εs
1− εs
)
,
from which Equation (37) follows.
Acceptance Region.—Using Figure 1 and Lemma 3, the cheapest way to locate the junior
agent in the Acceptance Region is to set h∗j = h
0
j , so that the expected junior agent’s wage
bill is
W Accj =
εj
1− εj
c
∆p
(h0j(σ
∗)− hR) (p+ ∆p) ; (39)
it is clear from Figure 1 that W Accj is increasing in σ
∗ for σ∗ ≥ σˆ.
Using Equation (14), the senior agent’s optimal compensation contract can be imple-
mented by setting
wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
η(σ∗)− hR
p+ ∆p
; wsj = 0
so that, substituting these values and wsj = 0 into Equation (24) with I
0
j = I
1
j = 1, the
expected wage payment to the senior agent is
W Accs =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) (p+ ∆pFh(σ∗)) .
Once again, W Accs is trivially increasing in σ
∗ for σ∗ ≥ σˆ.
The expected surplus generated when the junior agent’s trigger value is in the Acceptance
Region is
S Acc = 2(pi + v¯ + p∆pi) + hˆc(1 + Fh(σ
∗))− hc(1 + FH(σ∗)),
from which it follows that ∂S
Acc
∂σ∗ = cfh(σ
∗)(hˆ− η(σ∗)), which is negative for σ∗ > σˆ, positive
for σ∗ < σˆ, and zero when σ∗ = σˆ.
Lemma 13. Suppose that agents are act-utilitarians and that the acceptance region is to be
implemented. Then the principal implements σ∗ = σˆ, sets the senior agent’s wage to zero
and pays the junior agent a success bonus wj = wjAct(h
0
j).
Proof. The principal’s profit is equal to the expected surplus net of the expected wages:
ΠAccS , S Acc − W Accs − W Accj . We have shown that this is decreasing in σ∗ for σ∗ ≥ σˆ, so
that the principal implements σ∗ = σˆ. Equation (14) then implies that the senior agent’s
wage is zero; the junior agent bonus is derived before Equation (39).
Lemma 14. Suppose that agents are other-regarding and that the acceptance region is to be
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implemented. Then the principal optimally sets σ∗Duty < σˆ and
η(σ∗Duty) <
hˆ
1 + εs
1−εs
. (40)
Proof. Since S Acc attains a maximum at σ∗ = σˆ and W Accj,Duty + W
Acc
s,Duty is increasing in σ
∗
we must have σ∗Duty < σˆ. The principal’s first order condition for σ
∗ is
fh(σ
∗)
(
hˆ− η(σ∗)
(
1 +
εs
1− εs
))
=
εs
1− εs
1
∆p
(p+ ∆pFh(σ
∗))
∂η
∂σ
(σ∗) +
εj
1− εj
1
∆p
(p+ ∆p)
∂h0j
∂σ
(σ∗);
because the right hand side of this expression is positive, Equation (40) follows.
Rejection Region.—It is clear from Figure 1 that the cheapest way to place the junior in
the Rejection Region is to set h∗j = hR < h
1
j and to pay a state-independent wage of 0. This
is possible for act-utilitarian agents only if h > hˆ and σ∗ >
(
h1j
)−1 (
hˆ
)
≥ σˆ.
The senior agent’s optimal compensation contract can be implemented by setting
wsj =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
η(σ∗)− hR
p
,
so that, adapting Equation (26) to junior rejection, the expected wage payment to the senior
agent is
W Rejs,R =
εs
1− εs
c
∆p
(η(σ∗)− hR) (p+ ∆pFh(σ∗)) .
W Rejs,Act is increasing in σ
∗ for σ∗ ≥ σˆ, and W RejDuty is increasing in σ∗.
The expected surplus when the junior agent’s trigger value is in the Rejection Region is
S Rej = 2(pi + v¯ + p∆pi) + hˆcFh(σ
∗)− hcFH(σ∗),
from which it follows that
∂S Rej
∂σ∗
= cfh(σ
∗)(hˆ− η(σ∗)). (41)
Lemma 15. Rejection can never be optimal when agents are act-utilitarian.
Proof. For act-utilitarian agents, σ∗ ≥ σˆ. Hence S Rej − W Rejs,Act is declining in σ∗. The
principal therefore optimally lowers σ∗ out of the Rejection Region.
Lemma 16. Suppose that agents are other-regarding and that the rejection region is to be
implemented. Then the principal optimally sets σ∗Duty < σˆ and Condition (40) is satisfied.
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Proof. It follows from Equation (41) that S Rej attains a local maximum at σˆ. Since W Rejs,i
s increasing in σ∗, we must have σ∗Duty < σˆ. When σ
∗
Duty > 0, the principal’s first order
condition is
fh(σ
∗)
(
hˆ− η(σ∗)
(
1 +
εs
1− εs
))
=
εs
1− εs
(
p
∆p
+ Fh(σ
∗)
)
∂η
∂σ
(σ∗).
The right hand side of this expression is positive, and Condition (40) follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.—Lemma 15 implies that rejection can never be optimal with act-
utilitarian agents. Lemma 11 implies that the principal extracts all of the expected surplus
from P in the Cultural Assimilation region when R = Act and, hence, has expected income
S Ass(σ∗ = σˆ). By Lemma 13, the principal has expected incomeS Acc(σ∗ = σˆ)−W Assj,Act(σ∗ =
σˆ). But
S Ass −S Acc = c
[
h(1− FH(σˆ))− hˆ(1− Fh(σˆ))
]
(42)
= ch(1− h)fH(σˆ)(1− FH(σˆ))
fh(σˆ)
[
fL(σˆ)
fH(σˆ)
− 1− FL(σˆ)
1− FH(σˆ)
]
,
which is positive by Lemma 9. Proposition 2 follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3.—Lemmas 12, 14 and 16 together prove that, irrespective of
whether junior agents accept, reject, or culturally assimilate, σ∗Duty < σˆ. The same Lemmas
give the limit on η(σ∗Duty) identified in the Proposition. That acceptance, rejection, and
cultural assimilation are all possible is demonstrated with examples in the text following the
statement of the Proposition.
Proof of Lemmas 5 and 6.
The Lemmas are a consequence of the expressions for ΠAssS,Act, Π
Ass
S,Duty, Π
Acc
S,Duty, and Π
Rej
S,Duty
and the Envelope Theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4
Because na¨ıve customers do not charge for the harm caused by P, the principal’s profit
in the Cultural Assimilation and Acceptance regions, respectively, is ΠAssN,Act , ΠAssS,Act +
2hcFH(σ
∗) and ΠAccN,Act , ΠAccS,Act + hc(1 + FH(σ∗)). First we confirm that incentivising the
senior agent not to invoke surplus-enhancing practices cannot be optimal. By proposition
2, ∂ΠAssS,Act
/
∂σ∗
∣∣
σ∗<σˆ > 0, and so ∂Π
Ass
N,Act
/
∂σ∗
∣∣
σ∗<σˆ > 0. The case of ∂Π
Acc
N,Act
/
∂σ∗ is
analogous. Hence σ∗Act ≥ σˆ.
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It is then easy to prove that
∂ΠAssN,Act
∂σ∗
∣∣∣∣∣
σ∗=σˆ
= 2chˆfh(σ
∗)− Es c
∆p
η′(σˆ)
(
p2
2p+ ∆p
+ ∆pFh(σ
∗)
)
, (43)
which is greater than 0 precisely when Es is limited by the ratio of the first term in Equation
(43) to its coefficient in that Equation. This proves part 1 of the Proposition.
Similarly, we have
∂ΠAccN,Act
∂σ∗
∣∣∣∣∣
σ∗=σˆ
= hˆcfh(σˆ)− Es c
∆p
η′(σˆ) (p+ ∆pFh(σ∗))− Ej c
∆p
∂h0j
∂σ∗
(σˆ) (p+ ∆p) , (44)
whence part 2 of the Proposition follows with (1/κAccs , 1/κ
Acc
j ) equal to the respective coef-
ficients of Es and Ej in Equation (44), divided by hˆcfh(σˆ).
Note that η(σˆ) > h1j(σˆ) so that we have to have σ
∗
Act > σˆ in the Rejection Region.
The final part of the Proposition follows by using continuity at Es = Ej = 0 and noting
that
ΠAccN,Act − ΠAssN,Act
∣∣
Es=Ej=0
= hˆc(1− Fh(σ∗)) > 0
and ΠAccN,Act − ΠRejN,Act
∣∣∣
Es=Ej=0
= hˆc > 0
Hence incentivising junior acceptance of P dominates rejection of P if the agents’ ethical
commitment is weak enough.
Proof of Lemma 7 and 8
The result is an immediate consequence of the expressions for ΠAssN , Π
Acc
N , Π
Rej
N , and the
Envelope Theorem.
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